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By Jeremy C. Stein
* 
I develop a model of bilateral conversations in which players honestly exchange ideas 
with their competitors.  The key to incentive compatibility is a complementarity in the 
information structure: a player can only generate a new insight if he has access to his 
counterpart’s previous thoughts on a topic.  I then examine a social network in which A 
has a conversation with B, then B has a conversation with C, and so on.  Relatively 
underdeveloped ideas can travel long distances over the network.   More valuable ideas, 
by contrast, tend to remain localized among small groups of agents.  (JEL D82, D83) 
 
  Conversation is a central part of economic life.  A wide range of information gets 
passed from one person to another via word-of-mouth communication, and a number of 
authors argue that the nature of connections between people—i.e., the structure of social 
networks—can have a profound influence on how far and how efficiently information 
spreads across the economy.
1  For example, in the context of financial markets, Robert J. 
Shiller (2000, p. 155) writes: “Word-of-mouth transmission of ideas appears to be an 
important contributor to day-to-day or hour-to-hour stock market fluctuations…”  
  In many sorts of conversations, it can be taken for granted that the participants 
will communicate honestly with one another.  If one friend asks another for her opinion 
of, say, a restaurant or movie, it is hard to see why the response would be anything other 
than completely truthful.  However, there are also a number of important cases where it is 
less  obvious  that  an  honest  exchange  of  information  can  be  expected.    Often  the 
participants  in  a  conversation  are  competitors  with  one  another,  at  least  along  some   2
dimension, which means that when one player’s information set is improved, the other 
player may be made worse off.  Consider the following illustrations: 
  1.  Professional money managers:  Harrison Hong, Jeffrey D. Kubik, and Jeremy 
C. Stein (2005) document that mutual-fund managers in a given city tend to have trading 
behavior that covaries more strongly with other managers in the same city, as opposed to 
with managers in different cities.  Lauren H. Cohen, Andrea Frazzini, and Christopher J. 
Malloy  (2007)  uncover  a  similar  correlation  structure  in  the  trades  of  mutual-fund 
managers who went to college together.  These findings can be interpreted as evidence of 
word-of-mouth communication among those fund managers who are socially connected 
to each other.
2  But given that professional money mangers have strong incentives to care 
about relative performance, it is not clear why one would tell another honestly about an 
attractive trading opportunity that he has discovered.
3 
  2.  Knowledge spillovers in Silicon Valley:  Many observers argue that the free 
flow of ideas across firms has been a key factor in fostering the high rate of technological 
progress in the Silicon Valley.  For example, AnnaLee Saxenian (1994, p. 2-3) writes: 
“Silicon  Valley  has  a  regional  network-based  industrial  system  that 
promotes  collective  learning  and  flexible  adjustment  among  specialist 
producers  of  a  complex  of  related  technologies...Companies  compete 
intensely  while  at  the  same  time  learning  from  one  another  about 
changing markets and technologies through informal communications…” 
(Italics added.) 
 
Yet if Silicon Valley firms do in fact compete intensely with one another, wouldn’t any 
one executive be tempted either to withhold valuable information from his peers in other 
firms, or to actively mislead them, in the course of an informal conversation?    
  In this paper, I propose a theory of incentive-compatible information exchange 
among players who, as in the above examples, are in competition with one another.  The   3
theory has two key ingredients.  First, information flows in both directions—from player 
A  to  player  B  and  vice-versa—during  the  course  of  a  conversation,  as  players  quite 
literally  take  turns  bouncing  ideas  off  of  one  another.    This  differs  from  the  classic 
framework of Vincent P. Crawford and Joel Sobel (1982).  Like I do, Crawford and Sobel 
pose the question of whether “cheap talk” can be credible in a situation where the two 
parties involved have partially conflicting interests.  But in their model, one party is 
always  the  better-informed  “sender”,  and  the  other  is  always  the  less-well-informed 
“receiver”, so there is no scope for two-way communication.
4 
  The second key ingredient is a strong form of complementarity in the information 
structure.  In particular, player B can only come up with the next idea in stage t of a 
conversation if player A has disclosed his idea from stage t–1.
5  This complementarity, 
combined with the two-way nature of the conversation, is what allows for incentive-
compatible dialogue.  If player A deviates from a truth-telling equilibrium at stage t–1 by 
lying  to  player  B,  he  makes  B  less  well-informed—which  A  prefers,  since  B  is  his 
competitor.  At the same time, this also precludes B from coming up with a further idea at 
stage t which builds on A’s previous insight, and which might have been passed back to 
A had the conversation continued in an honest fashion.  This is a direct cost to player A.  
I show that if this latter effect is strong enough, it can be incentive-compatible for players 
to share their ideas truthfully with one another at all stages of a conversation. 
  The model can also be used to study the dynamics of information diffusion along 
social networks that encompass more than two players.  Suppose that after A and B 
conclude their conversation, B can choose whether or not to tell a third player C what he 
has learned from the conversation, in the hopes that C may be able to further build on this   4
idea.  I show that B will only do so if his initial informational advantage over C is not too 
big—i.e., so long as B’s prior conversation with A was not too productive.   
This logic leads to a novel account of information diffusion in which relatively 
underdeveloped ideas can travel long distances and be shared by many agents, but in 
which more fully realized—and hence more valuable—ideas tend to remain localized 
among just a few agents.  In other words, even if all agents in the economy are connected 
to  the  same  network,  incentive-compatibility  considerations  create  an  endogenous 
tendency for the most valuable ideas to stay confined to small groups.   
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section I models a single 
conversation among two players.  Section II extends the basic framework to incorporate 
many players who are arrayed along a straight-line network, and who can have sequential 
conversations with their immediate neighbors. This extension allows one to ask how far a 
given set of ideas can travel along the network, and how the distance traveled relates to 
the  quality  of  the  ideas.    Section  III  discusses  the  model’s  implications  for  Shiller’s 
(2000) hypothesis, namely that word-of-mouth transmission of ideas can have significant 
consequences for asset prices.  Section IV concludes. 
 
I.  The Basic Model: A Single Conversation 
A.  Information Structure 
  There are two players, A and B, engaged in a conversation.  They take turns 
moving, so that A moves at times 1, 3, 5, etc., and B moves at times 2, 4, 6, etc.  At time 
1, player A has access to an initial idea  1 that he can choose to communicate to player B.  
This idea has two uses.  First, anybody observing  1 can eventually “decode” it—i.e., can   5
map it into a payoff-relevant signal s1( 1).  This decoding is assumed to happen after the 
conversation has ended and A and B have gone their separate ways.  
  Second, if player B gains access to  1, he has a probability p of coming up with 
another idea  2 at time 2 that builds on and refines  1, and that can be mapped into a 
second payoff-relevant signal s2( 2).  Crucially, if idea  1 is not truthfully revealed to 
player B, he can never come up with  2.  This assumption embeds a strong form of 
complementarity into the production function for ideas: a useful new idea can only be 
produced by an agent who has access to the prior idea. 
  The process can continue indefinitely, until one player fails to come up with an 
idea.  In particular, if at any odd date t, player A has observed player B’s prior-period 
idea  t-1, he has a probability p of coming up with another idea  t, which he can then 
choose to communicate to B.   Again, it is impossible for A to generate idea  t without 
having been exposed to a complete and truthful description of idea  t-1.   And whoever 
observes  t can, after the conversation has ended, go off and generate the signal st( t). 
  Of course, a player in possession of an idea need not communicate it truthfully.  
In particular, if player A has come up with an idea  t at time t, he may either: i) not say 
anything to player B, effectively pretending that he was unable to come up with an idea; 
or ii) pass along a bogus (i.e., informationally useless) version of the idea,  t
b.  I assume 
that the former option is costless, but that the latter imposes on A an arbitrarily small 
positive cost of  .
6  Moreover, in the latter case, player B does not immediately recognize 
that he has been lied to—he takes the statement of  t
b at face value and attempts to come 
up with a further insight that builds on it.  It is only after the conversation ends, when B   6
attempts to decode the ideas that he has collected, that he learns that  t
b is useless: at that 
point, he is unable to turn  t
b into a payoff-relevant signal.  
 
B.  Payoffs 
  At the conclusion of the conversation, the players attempt to decode the ideas they 
have obtained.  Let nA represent the total number of signals that player A is able to 
produce (which equals the total number of nonbogus ideas that he has collected), and let 
nB represent the total number of signals that player B is able to produce.  To capture the 
notion that the players are competitors, A’s payoff should be an increasing function of nA, 
and a decreasing function of nB, and vice-versa. 
  In  order  to  generate  payoff  functions  with  transparent  microfoundations,  I 
consider a specific competitive setting with a simple market structure.  As will become 
apparent, this setting connects more directly to the Silicon Valley production-technology 
example sketched in the introduction than to the fund-manager example.   
  Think  of  the  signals  generated  by  a  conversation  as  elements  of  a  recipe  for 
building a product more efficiently.  In particular, if player A has access to nA signals, he 
can manufacture the product for a cost of (1 – h(nA)), and symmetrically for player B.  
Here h(n) is an increasing function that captures the total cost savings associated with n 
signals.  I will put more structure on the h(n) function below, but for the moment I leave 
its general form unspecified, and just impose the conditions that h(0) = 0, and h( ) < 1. 
  I assume that player A and player B each face a unit mass of customers for the 
new product, and that all customers have a reservation value of one.  Moreover, there is a 
fractional overlap of   in A’s and B’s customer bases, with 0 <   < 1.  In other words, A   7
has a monopoly on a fraction (1 –  ) of his customers, but must compete with B for the 
remaining fraction  .  I further assume that the products are otherwise undifferentiated, so 
that when competition between A and B does occur, it is à la Bertrand.   In what follows, 
  can be thought of as a proxy for the degree of competition between A and B. 
  Taken together, the assumptions imply that the payoffs to player A and player B 
are respectively given by:  
 
(1)             UA = (1 –  )h(nA) +  max{0, h(nA) – h(nB)} 
 
(2)            UB = (1 –  )h(nB) +  max{0, h(nB) – h(nA)}. 
 
  The first part of (1) corresponds to the fact that for a fraction (1 –  ) of his 
customers, A is a monopolist and charges the full reservation value of one; with a cost of 
(1 – h(nA)), his profits per customer are thus h(nA).  On the remaining fraction   of his 
customers, where A and B overlap, Bertrand competition implies that A only makes a 
profit to the extent that his costs are strictly below those of B. 
  To give a concrete example, suppose that player A has been exposed to ideas  1 
through  5, while player B has only been exposed to ideas  1 through  4; this would 
happen  if,  after  having  observed   5,  A  decided  either  to  remain  quiet,  or  to  make  a 
dishonest report of  5 to B.  It follows that player A can generate the first five signals s1 
through s5, while player B can only generate the first four signals  s1 through s4.  Thus we 
have UA = h(5) –  h(4), and UB = (1 –  )h(4). 
   8
C.  Benchmark Case: No Complementarities in Idea Production 
  Before  proceeding,  it  is  useful  to  establish  a  benchmark  result,  namely  that 
conversations can never arise absent complementarities in idea production of the sort 
described above.  The following proposition summarizes the result. 
 
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose that a player’s probability of having an idea  t at time t—
and hence of being able to generate the signal st( t)—is fixed at p, and is independent of 
whether he has been given a truthful report of the prior idea  t-1.  In this case, it can 
never be part of an equilibrium for players to truthfully exchange ideas with one another. 
  
PROOF:  Assume to the contrary that there does exist an equilibrium in which the players 
truthfully exchange ideas.  Taking player B’s honest reporting strategy as given, at any 
time t player A will wish to deviate from the proposed equilibrium, and mislead B with a 
dishonest report—i.e., A will want to report  t
b instead of  t.  Such a report leaves B with 
one less signal than A.  Moreover, since B does not know (until after the conversation has 
ended) that the report was dishonest, he cannot punish A for the deviation.  Thus A does 
not experience any reduction in signals as a result of deviating; the only cost he bears is 
the   cost of inventing the bogus report.  With nA unchanged, and nB reduced to a value 
strictly lower than nA, (and with   assumed to be arbitrarily small), equation (1) tells us 
that the deviation strictly increases player A’s payoff UA.  
 
  Intuitively, without complementarities in idea production, player A can only gain 
by deviating from the honest equilibrium and lying to player B about his ideas—such a   9
lie leaves B less well-informed, and taking B’s truthful-reporting strategy as fixed, does 
not degrade the quality of the information that A expects to get back from B.   The fact 
that it is impossible to sustain a cooperative outcome in this setting, in spite of an infinite 
horizon,  distinguishes  the  no-complementarities  version  of  the  model  from,  e.g.,  an 
infinitely-repeated prisoner’s dilemma game.  The key distinction is that in the prisoner’s 
dilemma case, a deviation from the cooperative strategy is immediately observable and 
hence can be punished in a tit-for-tat fashion, while the same is not true here, since lies 
cannot be detected until after the conversation has concluded. 
   This logic also suggests why complementarities in idea production are necessary 
for an honest exchange of ideas.  In a setting with complementarities, if A misleads B 
about his idea  t, A also stands to bear a cost.  This is because without access to an honest 
report of  t, B can no longer come up with the next useful idea, which—assuming that B 
is playing an honest-reporting strategy—could otherwise have been bounced back to A.   
 
D.  Sustaining a Conversation: Necessary Conditions 
  I now return to the case where there are complementarities in idea production, and 
explore  the  conditions  under  which  a  cooperative  conversational  equilibrium  can  be 
sustained.  To do so, I hypothesize that such an equilibrium exists, and then check that at 
each date t, neither player has an incentive to deviate from the proposed equilibrium. 
  In a fully cooperative equilibrium, each player truthfully reports any idea that he 
has to the other player.  This continues until one player fails to come up with an idea, at 
which time he truthfully announces this as well, and the conversation concludes, with 
each player having access to the same total number of ideas.   10
  Now suppose it is date t, and that player i has just come up with an idea  t.  If he 
reports it honestly, and the game continues along the equilibrium path until somebody 
fails to come up with an idea, player i’s expected payoff, EUi(continue@t), is given by: 
  
(3)        EUi(continue@t) = (1 –  )H(t),  
 
where: 
(4)               ) ( ) 1 ( ) (
0
i t h p p t H
i
i       
 
 
 
 
  In words, H(t) is the expected value of the total cost reduction h( ) that both 
players will realize if player i shares  t and they continue to play cooperatively from that 
point on.  For example, with probability (1 – p), there will be no further ideas after time t, 
so each player will wind up with t signals that have a total cost-cutting value of h(t); with 
probability p(1 – p), there will be exactly one further idea after t, so each player will wind 
up with (t + 1) signals that have a total cost-cutting value of h(t + 1); and so forth. 
  By  contrast,  suppose  that  player  i  considers  deviating  from  the  proposed 
cooperative equilibrium at time t.  We can focus our attention on deviations which take 
the form of player i putting an end to the conversation by not reporting an idea  t that he 
is in possession of at time t.
7   In this case, his payoff, Ui(stop@t), is given by: 
  
(5)        Ui(stop@t) = h(t)  –  h(t – 1).   11
  This expression reflects the fact that if i deviates, he keeps idea  t to himself, and 
therefore winds up with one more signal than the other player (t signals versus (t – 1)).  
This allows him to not only earn a profit of (1 –  )h(t) from the part of the market that he 
has all to himself, but also a profit of  (h(t)  – h(t – 1)) on the part of the market that he 
has to compete for with the other player, since he now has a cost advantage. 
  In  order  for  the  cooperative  equilibrium  to  hold  together,  we  require  that: 
EUi(continue@t)    Ui(stop@t) for all values of t.  Substituting in from equations (3) and 
(5), and doing some rearranging, this requirement can be expressed as: 
 
(6)       
) 1 (
1
)) 1 ( ) ( (
)) 1 ( ) ( (
   
 
   
   
t h t h
t h t H
 . 
 
  Thus we have: 
 
PROPOSITION 2:  If condition (6) is satisfied for all values of t, it is possible to sustain 
a conversation in which each player truthfully reports every idea he has to the other 
player, until one of the two players fails to come up with a further idea. 
 
  E.  A Parametric Example: Geometric Decay in the Value of Successive Ideas 
  As stated, the necessary condition in (6) is not transparent, because it depends on 
the shape of the h(n) function.  To make things more intuitive, it is helpful to put some 
structure on this function.  One particularly tractable choice is the following: 
 
(7)          h(n) = (1 –  
n)   12
 
with  0  <     <  1.    This  formulation  corresponds  to  the  assumptions  that:  i)  as  a 
conversation goes on, each new idea is of less value than the previous one; and ii) that 
this decay is geometric in nature.  In particular, the incremental cost savings associated 
with the nth signal is given by  
n-1(1 –  ).  Thus the first signal lowers costs by (1 –  ), 
the second signal further lowers costs by  (1 –  ), and so forth.   
  With this functional form, condition (6) can be re-written more specifically as: 
  
(8)       
) 1 (
1
) (
) ) 1 ( (
1
0
1
     
   
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
   
t t
i t
i
i t p p
 . 
 
  Condition (8) in turn can be greatly simplified to yield: 
 
(9)          ,
) 1 (
1
) 1 (
1
     
 
  p
 
 
or, alternatively, 
 
(10)                     p     . 
 
  The inequality in (10) captures in a simple way the three main factors that make it 
possible for conversations to be sustained.  First, and most obviously, it helps if the 
competition parameter   is small, so that one player only suffers a little bit when the   13
other’s information set is improved.  Second, it also helps if p is large, which means that 
when one player truthfully reveals an idea to the other at time t, there is a relatively high 
likelihood  that  another  idea  will  be  bounced  back  to  him  at  time  t+1;  this  makes 
continuing the conversation more attractive relative to deviating and cutting it short.  And 
finally, incentives for cooperation are also stronger when the decay parameter   is closer 
to one; this means that the marginal value of incremental ideas declines slowly, which 
also increases the appeal of continuing the conversation as opposed to cutting it off. 
  It is worth noting that the simple condition in (10) is independent of t.  In other 
words, the incentive to continue a conversation does not depend on how far into it the 
players are.  This is true even though the amount of information that is yet to be gained 
decreases with t.  Intuitively, there are two offsetting effects.  On the one hand, as time 
passes, the absolute appeal of continuation declines.  On the other hand, so does the 
absolute appeal of deviating, and thereby staying one step ahead of one’s competitor.   
Since all that matters is the ratio of these two quantities, they offset each other exactly, 
causing t to drop out of the comparison.  This can be seen explicitly by looking at (8), 
where the numerator of the left-hand-side (which reflects the appeal of continuation) and 
the denominator (which reflects the appeal of deviating) are both proportional to  
t-1, 
causing  
t-1 to drop out when the expression is simplified. 
 
II.  Sequential Conversations: Information Diffusion On a Social Network 
A.  Extending the Basic Model 
I now augment the model so that there are multiple players arrayed along a simple 
social network, namely a straight line.  I assume that each player only interacts with his   14
immediate neighbors, and that this interaction happens sequentially, starting with players 
A and B.  Thus after A and B conclude their conversation, B must choose whether or not 
to initiate a conversation with player C.  If this happens, then when B and C conclude 
their conversation, C can choose whether to start one with player D, and so on. 
In order to generate the players’ payoff functions, I consider the natural extension 
of the market structure from the two-player case.  Specifically, every player in the interior 
of the network (i.e., every player but A) now has a customer base that overlaps partially 
with his neighbors on either side.  For example, of the unit mass of customers facing 
player B, a fraction   overlaps with player A, another fraction   overlaps with player C, 
and a fraction (1 – 2 ) are customers who are exclusive to B—i.e., customers over whom 
B has monopoly power. (Note that I must now assume that   < ½, which is innocuous.) 
It follows that player A’s payoff function remains as in equation (1), while the 
payoff function for player B is modified to: 
 
(11)         UB = (1 – 2 )h(nB) +  max{0, h(nB) – h(nA)} +  max{0, h(nB) – h(nC)}. 
 
An analogous expression holds for the payoffs of each of the players who come after B. 
 
B.  Necessary Conditions for a Second Conversation to Get Started 
   Assume for the moment that the first conversation—that between A and B—is 
itself incentive-compatible.  As we have seen, this conversation will go on until one of 
the two players is unable to come up with a further refinement.  At this point, A and B 
part ways.  Let k denote the random number of signals that A and B are able generate   15
after their conversation concludes.  That is, both A and B have access to idea  k at the end 
of their conversation, and can therefore both manufacture signals s1 through sk. 
  Next, B has to decide whether or not to turn around and share idea  k with player 
C.  As before, the potential advantage of doing so is that player C will, with probability p, 
be able to come up with a further refinement  k+1, and that the conversation between B 
and C will continue on for several more stages from there.  The disadvantage to B of 
starting a conversation with C is that by giving C access to idea  k, B effectively gives C 
all of the first k signals s1 through sk—i.e., B repeats everything of value that was learned 
during the A-B conversation.  The implicit assumption here is that the refined idea  k also 
embodies all of the cumulative knowledge in the previous-stage ideas  1 through  k-1.  
Player B’s incentive to initiate a conversation with C is therefore lower than A’s 
original incentive to initiate a conversation with B.  This is because when A first speaks 
to B, he gives away a brand-new idea that is equivalent to just one signal, in the hopes of 
getting one more signal in return.  By contrast, when B first speaks to C, he gives away a 
more-fully-developed idea that is equivalent to k signals, again in the hopes of getting 
one more signal in return.   
To make this precise, observe that at the conclusion of the A-B conversation, with 
both A and B in possession of k signals, we can rewrite B’s payoff as: 
 
(12)          UB(k) = (1 – 2 )h(nB) +  max{0, h(nB) – h(k)} +  max{0, h(nB) – h(nC)} 
    = (1 –  )h(nB) –  h(k) +  max{0, h(nB) – h(nC)}. 
   16
  Based on (12), player B reasons as follows.  If he reveals his information to player 
C, and the conversation continues from there, player B’s expected payoff from initiating 
the B-C conversation is given by:
8 
 
(13)              EUB(initiate@BC) = (1 –  )H(k) –  h(k). 
 
Note that conditional on completing a conversation with player C, player B does not care 
if C then goes ahead and improves his information set via a subsequent conversation with 
player D.  This is because once B and C have access to the same number of signals, B can 
never earn a profit from those customers they have in common; this does not change if C 
eventually becomes even better informed than B. 
 If instead player B decides not to speak to player C, thereby eliminating the 
potential for any further conversations, he walks away with a payoff of: 
 
(14)        UB(withdraw@BC) = (1 –   )h(k). 
 
  Therefore, a necessary condition for player B to initiate a conversation with C is: 
 
(15)         
) 1 (
1
) (
) (
   
 
k h
k H
 . 
 
  Comparing (15) to (6), it is apparent that, for k = t, (15) implies (6), so that it is 
harder to satisfy (15), all else equal.  This formalizes the intuition stated above: at any 
point in time t,  it is easier to get a player to continue an existing conversation than it is to   17
get a player with an equally well-developed idea to initiate a new conversation: in the 
former case, the player is only being asked to give away one incremental signal, while in 
the latter, he is being asked to start things off by giving away k signals. 
 
C.  When Does Information Diffusion Come to a Stop? 
  For  concreteness,  the  remainder  of  the  analysis  in  the  paper  focuses  on  the 
parametric specification described above, that where the value of new signals decays 
geometrically.  With this specification, condition (15) boils down to: 
 
(16)        .
) 1 (
1
) 1 (
)) 1 /( ) 1 ( ( 1
   
   
 
 
 
     
k
k p p
 
 
  Observe that the previous necessary condition for continuing a conversation in the 
two-player model, given by (10), is just a special case of (16) with k = 1.  In other words, 
if player B winds up his conversation with A with just one signal, his decision of whether 
to initiate a new conversation with C is identical to his decision of whether to continue an 
existing conversation in the two-player version of the model, since either choice amounts 
to giving away one signal in exchange for the same expected informational return. 
  If  (16)  is  in  fact  satisfied  for  a  given  realization  of  k,  then  the  conversation 
between B and C gets off the ground.  This conversation then continues stochastically 
until one of the two is unable to generate a further refinement.  Suppose that this happens 
at the point where B and C can each generate k  signals, with k    k.  Now C faces the 
exact same problem in deciding whether to initiate a conversation with D, so he applies 
the same necessary condition as B did previously, except that k is replaced in (16) with k .   18
  Using this sequential logic, we can describe the dynamics of information diffusion 
in the multi-player version of the model.  Note that the left-hand side of (16) is strictly 
decreasing in k.  Now define k
* as that value of k for which (16) holds with equality:  
 
(17)                  .
) log(
)) 1 ( ) 1 ( log( ) log( ) 1 log( *
 
                   
 
p p p
k   
 
  The following proposition describes the outcome for the geometric-decay case:
9 
 
PROPOSITION 3:  Consider two adjacent players J and K in the network, and assume 
that  (10)  is  satisfied,  so  that  once  initiated,  conversations  can  always  be  sustained.  
Assume further that J and K conclude a conversation with each having the ability to 
produce kJK signals.  If kJK   k
*, player K then initiates a new conversation with the next 
player L in the network, and the process of information diffusion continues forward.  If  
kJK > k
*, no further conversations are initiated. 
 
  Example 1:  Suppose that   = 0.95,   = 0.1, and p = 0.5.  Then according to (17), 
k
* = 6.95.  Thus if a conversation between J and K ends with each able to produce 6 or 
fewer signals, K initiates a new conversation with L.  If a conversation between J and K 
ends with each able to produce 7 or more signals, no further conversations are initiated. 
 
D.  Implications for Number of Participants, Quality of Ideas, and Conformity 
  With Proposition 3 in hand, it is possible to establish a number of properties of the 
sequential model.  The statements that follow center on two items of interest.  First, the   19
random variable c is defined as the number of conversations that occur in a given play of 
the game subsequent to the initial A-B conversation (which, under the assumption that 
(10) is satisfied, always takes place).  Second, the random variable k, which we have 
already encountered, is the duration of the initial A-B conversation.  One way to think 
about  k  is  that  it  measures  the  quality  of  the  idea  that  emerges  from  this  first 
conversation.  Alternatively, k can be interpreted as measure of the degree of pairwise 
conformity among participants in the conversational chain.  Specifically, for any given 
play of the game, k is equal to the number of signals that the initial player A holds in 
common with any other player J who has participated in the chain.  Thus k is a summary 
statistic  for  the  extent  to  which  A’s  and  J’s  production  technologies  (or  forecasts, 
depending on the setting) resemble one another. 
  As described in the introduction, one of the main insights of this paper is that 
when ideas travel further, they tend to be of lower quality, and hence to induce a weaker 
degree of conformity among those who have been exposed to them.  There are two ways 
that this insight can be expressed in the language of the model.  The first, and perhaps 
most natural way to do so, is to fix the parameters p,  , and  , and to make statements 
about the correlation between the ex-post realizations of c and k.  The appendix (to be 
made available online) establishes the following: 
 
PROPOSITION 4:  Let  ck denote the correlation between the random variables c and k.  
For any values of the parameters p,  , and   such that (10) holds, we have that  ck < 0. 
   20
  The  logic  behind  the  proposition  is  straightforward.    Suppose  that  the  initial 
conversation between A and B is blessed by good luck, and continues for many rounds, 
so that the number of signals k is relatively high.  In this case, k  is closer to k
*, which 
represents the cutoff point beyond which no new conversations are started; it is therefore 
more likely that the whole process will soon come to a stop.  Said a bit differently, the 
expected number of subsequent conversations conditional on k, E(c  k), is declining in k.  
  An  alternative  way  to  think  about  the  relationships  between  the  number  of 
conversations, idea quality, and conformity, is to compute the ex ante expected values of 
c  and  k,  and  then  to  see  how  these  expected  values  vary  as  we  change  one  of  the 
exogenous parameters, say p.  The appendix shows that there are simple closed-form 
expressions for the expected values of c and k: 
 
PROPOSITION 5:  Assume that (10) holds, and define I(k
*) as the greatest integer that is 
less than or equal to k
*.  Then we have:  E(c) = I(k
*)(1 – p)/p, and E(k) = 1/(1 – p). 
 
  The  comparative  statics  that  follow  from  Proposition  5  are  for  the  most  part 
intuitively obvious.  First, it is immediate that dE(k)/dp > 0.  Since one can interpret p as 
a proxy for the talent of the players in a given network—more talented players are less 
likely to draw a blank at any given point in a conversation—this just says that both the 
expected  quality  of  the  idea  emerging  from  the  initial  A-B  conversation,  as  well  as 
conformity,  are  increasing  in  talent.    Second,  it  can  be  shown  that  E(c)  is  weakly 
decreasing in  , which means that the expected number of participants in a conversational 
chain increases when players are less competitive with one another.   21
  The one comparative static that is a little tricky is dE(c)/dp.   As it turns out, E(c) 
is not monotonic in p, because of the discreteness associated with the integer-valued 
function I(k
*).  However, if we get rid of this discreteness issue, it is possible to make a 
clearer statement.  Specifically, let  {E(c)} denote the upper bound on E(c) defined by: 
 
(18)                    {E(c)}= k
*(1 – p)/p . 
 
It can then be shown that d {E(c)}/dp < 0, as illustrated in Figure 1, which plots both 
E(c) and  {E(c)} as functions of p for   = 0.95 and   = 0.1.  In other words, as p 
increases,  the  upper  bound  on  the  expected  number  of  conversations  falls.    More 
precisely, an increase in p has two competing effects on  {E(c)}.  First, the expected 
length of any conversation goes up, and so it becomes more likely that any given cutoff 
point k
* is reached after a smaller number of conversations.  Second, however, the cutoff 
point  k
*  is  itself  an  increasing  function  of  p,  since  the  desirability  of  initiating  new 
conversations rises with talent.  As it turns out, the former effect dominates the latter, so 
that d {E(c)}/dp < 0.  This is established formally in the appendix. 
  Thus there is another sense in which we can think of the number of conversations 
as being negatively related to both idea quality and conformity.  As we increase the talent 
p of the players, the expected quality of the idea generated in the initial A-B conversation 
goes up, as does conformity; this is just the statement that dE(k)/dp > 0.  And the same 
increase in talent p also lowers the upper bound on the expected number of conversations, 
as we have just seen.  So if there is variation in p across social networks, it will trace out 
the  aforementioned  negative  relationships.    For  example,  if  one  social  network  is   22
composed of highly-talented managers, and another network is composed of lower-ability 
managers, the model predicts that conversational chains would be on average shorter in 
the former case, but that they would tend to transmit higher-quality ideas, and to induce 
more conformity among those managers that end up participating in the conversations.   
 
  Example 2:  First, suppose that, as in the previous example,   = 0.95,   = 0.1, and 
p = 0.5.  Straightforward calculation based on Proposition 5 yields: E(c) = 6,  {E(c)} = 
6.95, and E(k) = 2.  If we keep everything else the same but set p = 0.8, we obtain 
instead: E(c) = 4.25,  {E(c)} = 4.47, and E(k) = 5. 
 
III.  Conversations and Asset Prices 
  I have framed the discussion of the model in terms of a specific example, one in 
which “ideas” represent cost-savings innovations, and in which the “competitors” are 
rival producers.  Of course, this is not the only potentially relevant setting.  As noted in 
the introduction, Shiller (2000) hypothesizes that word-of-mouth transmission of ideas 
can play an important role in generating asset-price volatility.  In this context, “ideas” 
presumably  represent  signals  about  the  expected  returns  to  particular  investment 
strategies, and the “competitors” are professional investors. 
  Applied  this  way,  the  model  can  help  to  rationalize  the  empirical  findings  of 
Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005), and Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2007).  These papers 
show that there are clusters of correlation in the trades of mutual-fund managers who are 
either located in the same city, or who went to college together—patterns that strongly   23
suggest word-of-mouth diffusion of investment ideas.  And notably, these effects show 
up among agents who have clear incentives to care about relative performance. 
   Beyond such patterns in trading behavior, can the mechanism in the model also 
generate interesting price effects of the sort envisioned by Shiller (2000)?   Here the 
answer is less clear-cut.  Note that a given idea will have more of an impact on stock 
prices to the extent that two conditions are satisfied: i) the idea reaches a large number of 
investors; and ii) its information content is substantial, so that each investor who comes 
into contact with the idea revises his expectations by a meaningful amount.  However, a 
central message from the model is that there can be a fundamental tension between these 
two conditions: those ideas that reach the largest numbers of investors are precisely those 
that tend to have relatively little real information content.
10  Indeed, in the limit, such far-
spreading ideas may not be much more substantial than gossip.  This is turn would seem 
to imply an endogenous upper bound on the magnitude of any word-of-mouth effect. 
  One caveat is that the upper bound argument relies on the premise that investors 
are rational, so that the stock-price impact associated with an idea is proportional to its 
true informational content. In reality, however, it may be that information obtained via 
face-to-face interaction is excessively salient and compelling to investors, as compared 
to,  say,  relatively  dry  earnings  releases.    If  so,  even  low-quality  rumors  might  have 
significant consequences for prices, which clearly helps Shiller’s story. 
 
IV.  Conclusions 
  The transmission of information by word-of-mouth occurs in a wide range of 
settings, including some in which agents have competing interests.  In the face of such   24
competition, an information structure with complementarities can be the glue that holds 
conversations together: it gives each participant in a conversation an incentive to honestly 
disclose a given idea, in the hopes that his counterpart will be able to take it one step 
further, and will then bounce the more fully-developed idea right back to him.    
  While  an  information  structure  with  complementarities  makes  conversations 
among competitors feasible, it does not remove all barriers to communication.  Thus 
while ideas can travel across networks of competitors who are connected to one another, 
they do not necessarily travel very far.  Indeed, the more successfully an idea develops in 
early-stage conversations, the more likely it is to remain localized among the handful of 
players who were its originators.  In contrast, low-quality ideas—those not much more 
informative than gossip—may ultimately be very widely diffused.    25
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1 See, e.g., Glenn D. Ellison and Drew Fudenberg (1995) for a theoretical treatment of word-of-mouth 
communication.  Matthew O. Jackson (2005) provides a recent survey of the literature on social networks. 
 
2 Indeed, recent theoretical work is beginning to explore the asset-pricing implications of information-
sharing along social networks, while maintaining the assumption that such information-sharing is feasible 
(Paolo Colla and Antonio Mele (2005), Han N. Ozsoylev (2005)). 
 
3 To be more precise, such an honest exchange of information would seem particularly puzzling if it 
happens before either party has taken a position in the asset in question.  Of course, if one manager already 
has a long position in a stock, he might wish to find a way to credibly communicate this to other managers, 
so that their buying pushes up the price of his position.   
 
4  The  same  can  be  said  about  a  number  of  recent  theoretical  papers  that  study  the  process  of  verbal 
communication, e.g., Vijay Krishna and John Morgan (2004), and Mathias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole 
(2005).    Although  they  substantially  enrich  the  basic  Crawford-Sobel  (1982)  model,  they  continue  to 
maintain the sender-receiver dichotomy, so that information only ever flows in one direction.  
 
5 Thomas F. Hellman and Enrico C. Perotti (2005) also emphasize the importance of complementarities in 
the production of ideas, though their focus is on a different set of issues.  More generally, this “standing-on-
the-shoulders” formulation is familiar in work on technological innovation (see, e.g., Philippe Aghion and 
Peter W. Howitt (1992)).   
 
6 This is a technical assumption whose purpose will become clear shortly.  One can motivate it by saying 
that it takes a little time and effort to come up with a good lie, or that lying is personally distasteful. 
 
7 In principle, a deviation could take the form of i either not reporting his idea to the other player, or 
inventing a bogus report.  However, unlike in the no-complementarities case of Proposition 1, now if i is 
going to deviate, it is a dominant strategy for him to do so by not reporting anything.  This is because in a 
world with complementarities, any deviation effectively ends the game from his perspective—once he 
stops feeding honest information to his counterpart, he can never get anything of value back.  So there is no 
point in spending the   cost of inventing a bogus report, when keeping quiet achieves the same outcome. 
 
8 One still has to check the incentive-compatibility conditions that ensure that once B and C have started a 
conversation, they will both want to continue it until they run out of ideas.  However, it is easy to show that 
these conditions are implied by (6).  Also, note that once a conversation is started, C will always have a 
stronger  incentive  to  continue  it  than  B.   This  is because  C  has  the option value  associated with  the 
possibility of moving on to a further conversation with D. 
 
9 It is possible to show that an analog to Proposition 3 holds for a broader class of payoff functions, h(n).  
Specifically, suppose that h(n) is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function such that h(0)=0, and 
limn   h(n) < 1, and that the general condition in (6) for sustaining a conversation is satisfied for all t.  One 
can then show that there exists a k
* with 1   k
* <   such that the proposition continues to apply.  
 
10 To map the model more literally into a financial-markets setting, suppose that each player wants to 
forecast the payoff V on a security, which can be written as an infinite sum: V = s1 + …. + s , where si is a 
normal random variable with a variance of  
i.  This formulation mirrors the set-up in the text: the marginal 
value of each successive signal—here in terms of the fraction of the variance of V that it explains—declines 
geometrically.   And a low-information-content, far-traveling idea is one that is comprised of just a small 
number of signals, and hence that explains only a small fraction of the overall variance of V.     27
Figure 1: 
E(c) and  {E(c)} as Functions of p 
 
 
 
Note: The above figure plots both E(c) = I(k
*)(1 – p)/p,  as well as its upper bound, 
 {E(c)} = k
*(1 – p)/p, as functions of p for   = 0.95 and   = 0.1. 
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